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STICKY INTUITIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
Suzanne B. Goldberg
As once-accepted empirical justifications for discriminating against lesbians and
gay men have fallen away, the major stumbling block to equality lies in a set of
intuitions, impulses, and so-called common sense views regarding sexual orientation
and gender. This Article takes up these impulses and views, which I characterize as
"sticky intuitions," to consider both their sustained influence and the prospects for their
destabilization. In this effort, I first offer a framework for locating the intuitions' work
within contemporary doctrine, culture, and politics. I then advance an extended
typology of the intuitions themselves, drawing from case law, scholarly literature, and
public discourse. Although the individual intuitions will not surprise those familiar
with the field, their amalgamation into a typology sheds light on their synergies as well
as the complex nature of their influence.
After describing these entangled intuitions, I offer several provisional observations
regarding intuitions' influence on lawmaking generally. I then raise what is likely to
be a critical question going forward: In an era in which courts and legislatures continue
to sustain sexual orientation discrimination, despite empirical data negating any
legitimate basis for the embraced distinctions, how much candor ought there be in
challenges to judicial and public squeamishness about homosexuality and gender roles?
Cognitive theorists offer helpful insights, although operationalizing what we know about
altering intuitions may be particularly difficult in the litigation context. Still, there are
a number of options that warrant continued consideration by both theorists and
strategists in the field.
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INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sodomy law in 1986
and declared Michael Hardwick's constitutional privacy claim "at best,
facetious,"' many condemned the decision as amounting to a gay exception to
the U.S. Constitution. At that time, several lines of privacy law suggested that
the state could not criminalize the private, noncommercial sexual intimacy of
consenting adults,3 yet a majority of the Court found that body of law largely
irrelevant to Hardwick's claim that the Constitution shielded him from arrest for
engaging in consensual sexual activity, in his bedroom, with another man.4
During the almost quarter-century since Bowers v. Hardwick5 was decided,
momentum has shifted markedly, with gay and lesbian litigants increasingly
winning their claims.6 Most striking, perhaps, is the Supreme Court's about-face
in Lawrence v. Texas,7 in which the Court not only reversed its earlier Bowers
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
2. See, e.g., JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V.
THE SUPREME COURT 334 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing married couples'
privacy right to access and use contraception and declaring the state's restriction on contraception to be
"repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 452 (1972) (extending Griswold and holding that the state's purported interest in deterring
fornication was not a sufficient interest to justify restricting unmarried individuals' access to birth control).
4. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
5. 478 U.S. 186.
6. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559-60 (2003) (invalidating Texas's "homosex-
ual conduct" law); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional
amendment that banned antidiscrimination protections for gay people); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941. 969 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing same-sex couples' right to marry).
7. 539 U.S. 558.
decision but also declared that Bowers was "not correct when it was decided"
and is "not correct today." Dramatic, too, was the 6-3 ruling in Romer v. Evans,9
in which the Court invoked an important race discrimination opinion-
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson' 0 -to reinforce its decision that a
state constitutional amendment barring antidiscrimination protection for gay
people violated the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause." And of course
there are a handful of state high court rulings authorizing marriage equality,'2 as
well as lesser known but also influential victories won by gay youth chal-
lenging abuse at school 3 and lesbian and gay parents seeking parental rights,4
among others.
Yet even with these advances, a Bowers-like gay exceptionalism continues
to repeat itself at both the state and federal level in courts around the country,
where the extant doctrine appears to support whatever gay rights claim is at
issue, but courts nonetheless find a way to reject the claim. 5 We see this excep-
tionalism outside the litigation context as well, where public officials and voters
promote and support restrictions on the rights of gay people, often in the
marriage, family law, and education settings, 6 even while the surrounding law
8. Id. at 578.
9. 517 U.S. 620.
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
12. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
13. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cit. 1996). For additional discussion of
Nabozny, see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a child may
have two mothers under the Uniform Parentage Act and that both can be required to pay child sup-
port); In the Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (authorizing second-parent adoption of
a child parented by two mothers); In re custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 437 (Wis. 1995)
(applying an equitable test to recognize parental rights of a lesbian functional parent).
15. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 1), 358 F.3d 804, 827
(11th Cir. 2004) (sustaining Florida's bar on adoption of children by gay adults); State v. Limon, 83
P.3d 229, 240 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding age-of-consent rules that punished same-sex
relationships more severely than different-sex relationships), rev'd, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005); Hemandez
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (relying on "[i]ntuition and experience" regarding childrearing to
sustain the state's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage); cf. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200
(N.J. 2006) (refusing to recognize a marriage right for same-sex couples despite a substantial body of
state law rejecting sexual-orientation-based distinctions).
16. See, e.g., Richard Salas, In re Marriage Cases: The Fundamental Right to Marry and Equal
Protection Under the Caifornia Constitution and the Effects of Proposition 8, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
545 (2009) (examining Califomia's Proposition 8); Rachel Simmonsen, Judge Tosses Lawsuit Over Gay
Club at Okeechobee High, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/
treasurecoast/content/tcoas/epaper/2008/04/10/O4lOogay.html?cxntlid=informsr (discussing school
officials' efforts to ban a gay-straight alliance organization at Okeechobee, FL high school); Adam
Pertman, Election Day Robbery, ARKANSAS TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, available at http://
www.arktimes.com/Articles/ArticleViewer.aspx?ArticlelD=838aea86-83a5-498c-a7d84ec62f96e303
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and much of the relevant data indicate that these restrictions are unjustified and
possibly impermissible."1
Thus, although today's legal landscape might appear to be stunningly posi-
tive to a gay rights supporter from the 1950s, or even the 1980s,"5 more needs
to be known about why judges, legislators, and other decisionmakers continue to
promote and sustain restrictions on the rights of lesbians and gay men, especially
in light of the changes over time. 9 As is often the case with restrictions imposed
on social groups, the underlying reasons for much contemporary discrimination
against lesbians and gay men today have relatively little to do with what is
actually articulated either in judicial opinions or by legislators in debate."
(reporting on the effects of an Arkansas referendum prohibiting adoption by gay and lesbian
prospective parents).
17. The starkest illustration of this point may be California's Proposition 8, which revoked
marriage rights from same-sex couples by popular vote after the California Supreme Court determined
that the denial of marriage rights violated the state constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 ("Only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."); Strauss v. Horton,
207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009) (describing the legal context surrounding Proposition 8's passage); cf. In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (invalidating California's exclusion of same-sex couples
from marriage based on the state constitution's due process and equal protection guarantees).
Similarly, courts have repeatedly rebuffed efforts by universities and school districts to forbid
meetings of gay student organizations or gay-straight alliances. See, e.g., Gay Students Org. of the Univ.
of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Colin ex rel. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F.
Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Gay-Straight Alliance of Yulee High Sch. v. Sch. Bd., 602 F. Supp. 2d
1233 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
Professional organizations have participated in both public debates and litigation to reinforce that an
individual's sexual orientation does not determine parenting ability. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Psychological
Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Respondents, Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E2d 1 (N.Y.
2006) (No. 86), 2006 WL 1930166; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Co-Parent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-
Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 339 (2002); see generally Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Relationships in the United States: A Social Science Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 607 (2006).
18. See, e.g., PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN
THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000) (reviewing the trajectory of social change
effected by the gay and lesbian rights movement).
19. The discussion here focuses predominantly on lesbians and gay men, rather than bisexuals,
because bisexuality has rarely been the express subject of legal regulation. See Kenji Yoshino, The
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353,353 (2000) (analyzing "why the category of
bisexuality has been erased in contemporary American political and legal discourse"). Likewise, although
several of the intuitions addressed in this Article implicate the legal status of transgender individuals,
there are also significant doctrinal and sociopolitical differences in the legal and social statuses of gay
and transgender people that warrant extended discussion beyond the scope of this Article. Rather than
engage in a strained merger of ideas in the face of these differences, I suggest that both the convergences
and divergences of intuitions and their influence are ripe for a separate inquiry. Cf. Taylor Flynn,
Tratsforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Sriggles for Sex and Sexual
Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 392 (2001) (observing that "jurisprudence that adopts
more accurate and multifaceted understandings of sex and gender," including jurisprudence particular
to transgender individuals, can have a substantial positive impact on the lives of lesbians and gay men).
20. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and
Fact-Based Adudicato, 106 COLUM. L REV. 1955 (2006) (analyzing the ways in which courts reason via
facts about social groups while leaving unacknowledged the normative underpinnings of their decisions).
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Instead, the major stumbling block to the treatment of sexual orientation
as a source of benign variation among people is a set of intuitions, impulses,
instincts, and so-called commonsense views regarding sexual orientation and
gender, which I collectively characterize here as "sticky intuitions"2 because of
the way they have maintained their influence well after being undermined by
both data and shifts in societal views. Legal doctrine remains relevant, of course,
but less as a force that exposes actual rationales and more as a frame that
constrains or facilitates the intuitions' operationalization. The project of
understanding and diminishing the legal significance of sexual orientation
thus requires navigation of this dynamic relationship between sticky intuitions
and doctrine.
In this Article, I examine, from three perspectives, the sustained influence
of intuitions on the rights of lesbians and gay men and the prospects for desta-
bilizing those intuitions going forward. First, I categorize the four basic types of
cases and debates where the rights of gay people are at issue. While cases
abound that nominally involve gay rights, only a subset turns directly on the
question whether governments and private actors may subject gay people to
discriminatory treatment. In the rest, intuitions regarding homosexuality and
gay people may be operative, but are often obscured by the way in which the
issues are framed. Thus, the point here is to understand more clearly the loca-
tions from which intuitions exert influence.
Second, against that background, I set out the intuitions that I contend
are at work. I suggest that although disgust and fear of contagion are often
cited as the primary explanations for hostility toward homosexuality, the set of
sentiments that contributes to the validation of restrictions on gay people's
rights today is more complexly constituted. More specifically, a variety of views
regarding homosexuality, gender roles, and sexuality more generally, as well
as a range of views regarding the role of government, enable sexual-orientation-
based discrimination to continue today. Although few of these views will come
as a surprise to scholars and advocates, their amalgamation in a typology,
together with illustrations from case law, public campaigns, and related matters,
sheds new light on their overlap and synergies as well as the complex nature of
their influence.22
21. For discussion of my broad use of "intuition," see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
22. The discussion here concentrates primarily, though not exclusively, on intuitions related to
sexuality and gender. For elaboration of concerns about government action in this arena, see, for exam-
ple, Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J.
C.R. &C.L. 357 (2009) (describing the Proposition 8 campaign to ban marriage for same-sex couples in
California as focused on "state infringement of the rights of the [nongay] polity"); Richard Posner,
Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1578, 1585 (1997)
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Part III of the Article considers the difficult choices associated with
responses to the intuitions' continuing power. I focus particularly on one of the
thorniest questions going forward: Given that the intuitions underlying contem-
porary sexual-orientation-based distinctions lack empirical support, how much
candor ought there be about them, from both advocates and courts? To think
through this question, I turn to cognitive theorists and others whose work focuses
on both how we develop our intuitions and how we alter them.
I must acknowledge at the outset that my use of the word "intuition"
stretches the conventional scope of the word, which is typically understood to
refer to a "knowing or sensing without the use of rational processes."23 As the
typology indicates, my aim is to capture a wide range of nonanalytically derived
beliefs that develop through a diverse array of belief systems.24 Thus, while
some of these beliefs might be differentiated from a fine-grained understanding
of intuition, the point here is to cast a wide net and gather together the set of
views that, though rarely surfaced, are often deeply held and significantly influ-
ential in sexual-orientation-related decisionmaking.
Further, this project is not one in which I can prove definitively that the
intuitions discussed here are actually driving the continued power of sexual-
orientation-based distinctions in law. Because they are often inchoate or
unanalyzed by those who invoke them, these intuitions typically go
unmentioned or undefended in court decisions and unelaborated in public
debates. Yet, as I argue here, because the empirical and doctrinal rationales for
sustaining gay/nongay classifications have fallen away, we must look beyond
what is articulated explicitly and consider the unstated assumptions at work.
(stating, with respect to marriage rights for same-sex couples, that "it is a mistake to suppose that legal
reasoning alone can underwrite so profound a change in public policy").
23. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 947 (3d ed. 1992).
More elaborately, scholars describe intuition as "a cognitive process that somehow produces an answer,
solution, or idea without the use of a conscious, logically defensible, step-by-step process." KENNETH
R. HAMMOND, HUMAN JUDGMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 60 (1996); cf. Erin Ryan, The Discourse
Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 233
(2005) (defining intuition broadly as "the mental manipulation of affective data"); R. George Wright,
The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1385 (2006) (noting that judges
frequently rely on intuition in reaching legal conclusions but do not "use the term 'intuition' in rigorous,
precisely defined senses").
24. Some of the sources for these views can be traced to (a) spiritual beliefs derived from a non-
empirical epistemology; (b) beliefs derived from path-dependent endorsement of others' beliefs for
affiliational, status, or cultural reasons; and (c) emotionally influenced beliefs reflecting involuntary
reactions. Although one might be self-aware of these sources, the beliefs they produce, and the contra-
dictory empirical evidence, the beliefs can remain difficult to dislodge and might, in that sense, be
described not only as sticky intuitions but also as stubborn beliefs. I am grateful to Terry Maroney for
this observation. For Maroney's thoughtful elaboration of the relationship between emotion and common
sense within constitutional law, see Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law,
62 VAND. L. REV. 851 (2009).
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A last preliminary point: Some observers would argue that when courts,
legislators, and voters sustain distinctions between gay and nongay people, they
act on bias that must be either overcome or regulated. 5 While it is likely true
that courts and others sometimes cloak biases and hostility with references
to intuitions, unproven assumptions, and common sense, refining our
understandings of intuitions would have little payoff if this were always the
case. In my view, however, treating all of these instances as reflecting the delib-
erate obscuring of hostility or bias is far too blunt an approach to capture the
variety of instincts that lead people, including judges, to accept legal distinctions
based on sexual orientation. Further, as a practical matter, pronouncements
of bias may do little to shift the positions of individuals who believe they are
acting rationally, as social psychologists and others have shown.26 Conse-
quently, while ongoing work to unmask prejudices continues to be important,
the field may remain unduly sticky if the grip of intuition is ignored.
I. INTUITIONS AND THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Only a subset of gay rights cases and legislative issues brings the sticky
intuitions directly into play by asking, explicitly, whether gay and nongay peo-
ple can reasonably be subjected to different treatment. In most other cases and
debates, sexuality- and gender-related intuitions might underlie the conflict at
issue, but they operate largely unacknowledged. By identifying the intuitions'
25. Cf. Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the "Civil Union"I"Marriage"
Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1480-81 (2009) (arguing that the distinction between civil unions
and marriages should be understood against the background of antigay bias in the surrounding culture).
Related to this is the view that what sustains sexual orientation discrimination is religious belief
rather than either bias or the intuitions set out below. On this point, it is certainly true that many who
favor legal distinctions based on sexual orientation link their position to their religious views regarding
sexuality. Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Atmospheric Harms in Constitutional Law, 69 MD. L. REV. 149
(2009); see generally Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 5 (2004). An additional factor associated with religiously based positions derives more
from concerns about government infringing on individuals' ability to educate their children and
otherwise act in accordance with their religious views. Cf. Answer Brief of Campaign for Cal. Families
on the Merits at 23, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999) (arguing that
"preserving the definition of marriage is not about preserving a tradition of discrimination or exclusion,
but about preserving the relationship upon which the future of society rests"); see generally Murray, supra
note 22; Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of
American Masculinity, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 271 (2003). Thus we see, along these lines, strong claims
against antidiscrimination laws in employment, housing, and public accommodations, opposition to
marriage rights for lesbian and gay couples, and resistance to school curricula that espouse respect for
sexual orientation diversity.
26. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
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whereabouts with some precision, we will be better positioned to theorize about
the intuitions' visibility and resilience and how best to confront them.7
Attention to the influence of intuitions produces a different organizational
scheme than the one that structures the dockets of impact litigation organi-
zations, which divide sexual orientation discrimination cases by subject matter
areas, such as family recognition, employment, law enforcement, and more."
Here, instead, I sketch four different ways in which legal framing exposes or
obscures the role of intuitions.
A. Explicit Sexual-Orientation-Based Distinctions
The first of the three categories is the most overtly evocative of intuitions.
This category consists of cases and related matters in which the state has distin-
guished explicitly, or close to explicitly,29 between gay and nongay people. The
primary, and often only, question on the table is whether the state can engage in
that type of line drawing. Most litigation regarding same-sex couples' exclusion
from marriage presents this question directly, as do challenges to prohibitions
against gay people adopting children, bans on students' bringing a same-sex date
to the prom, and the like. Because these cases expressly ask why the challenged
line-drawing is permissible, they are most likely to draw out explicit discussion-
or at least admission-of the operative intuitions.
In a particularly striking example, the Eleventh Circuit openly acknowl-
edged that it would rely upon its nondemonstrable and uncontestable sense of
things to sustain Florida's categorical exclusion of gay adults from adopting
children.3" Under the statute at issue, every single adult who seeks to adopt a
27. Although this Article does not focus primarily on shaping doctrinal arguments to address the
sticky intuitions, it bears noting that the choices among levels of scrutiny or even the quality of rational
basis review can make a significant difference to the visibility and force of the intuitions in the intuition-
based cases. Because the other types of cases tend to obscure the intuitions, levels of review are somewhat
less likely to be consequential in limiting the intuitions' influence on both the analysis and outcomes.
28. See, e.g., Lambda Legal, Docket, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/in-court/cases/
docket.html (last visited June 4, 2010); ACLU, LGBT Discrimination, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-
rightslgbt-discrimination (click the "Cases" tab on "Related Content" header) (last visited June 4, 2010);
National Center for Lesbian Rights, Case Docket, http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?
pagename=issue-casedocket (last visited June 20, 2010).
29. Here, I mean to include rules and policies that do not refer directly to sexual orientation but
have the primary consequence of burdening gay people or same-sex couples. I would put most marriage
laws into this category, as they do not discriminate explicitly based on sexual orientation, but their reser-
vation of marriage to different-sex couples has that discriminatory effect.
30. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 1), 358 F.3d 804, 819-20
( 1th Cit. 2004). A new challenge to the law remains pending. See ACLU, In re: Gill--Case Profile,
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rightshiv-aids/re-gill-case-profile (last visited June 4, 2010).
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child receives an individualized assessment-unless they are gay, in which case
they are banned outright from adopting.3
Rather than follow the robust empirical evidence showing that gay parents
are as likely as nongay parents to raise emotionally and physically healthy
children,32 the court turned to what I would characterize as a sticky intuition.
Addressing the state's mother-father preference, the court wrote, "We find this
premise to be one of those 'unprovable assumptions' that nevertheless can
provide a legitimate basis for legislative action.""
Intuitions and similar senses of things have also made their presence
known in marriage cases, which directly pose the question whether anything
about gay people could justify their exclusion from marriage. In 2006, for
example, a majority of the New York Court of Appeals answered that question
in this way: "Intuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from having
before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man and a
woman are like."34
31. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007) (providing that "[nio person eligible to adopt under this
statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual").
32. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dept. of Children and Family Servs. (Lofton II), 377 F.3d 1275, 1298
(11 th Cit. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stating that "many children throughout the country are lov-
ingly and successfully cared for by homosexuals in their capacity as biological parents, foster parents, or
legal guardians"); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, PARENTS,
AND CHILDREN (2004) ('There is no scientific evidence that parenting effectiveness is related to parental
sexual orientation: Lesbian and gay parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide supportive
and healthy environments for children.").
33. Lotion 1, 358 F.3d at 819-20 (quoting Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62-63
(1973)). By way of explanation, the court added that "[a]lthough social theorists from Plato to Simone
de Beauvoir have proposed alternative child-rearing arrangements, none has proven as enduring as
the marital family structure, nor has the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human experience
discovered a superior model." Id. at 820 (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, at Bk. V, 459d-461e (Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1992) (380 B.C.); SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans.,
Vintage Books 1989) (1949)).
34. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). The court added:
Plaintiffs seem to assume that they have demonstrated the irrationality of the view that oppo-
site-sex marriages offer advantages to children by showing there is no scientific evidence to
support it. Even assuming no such evidence exists, this reasoning is flawed. In the absence of
conclusive scientific evidence, the Legislature could rationally proceed on the commonsense
premise that children will do best with a mother and father in the home.
Id. at 84. See also Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (plurality opinion) (sus-
taining Washington's ban on same-sex couples marrying in part because "children tend to thrive" in a
"'traditional' nuclear family") (emphasis added). As Mary Anne Case has observed, the New York high
court's acceptance of children's exposure to "living models" of men and women as a rationale for state
action is also troubling because it runs contrary to the federal constitutional prohibition on embodying
in law any 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."' Mary Anne Case, A
Lot to Ask: Review Essay of Martha Nussbawn's From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and
Constitutional Law, 19 COLUM. J. OF GENDER & L 89, 120 (2010) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
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Outside the litigation context, sticky intuitions surface most directly in
public debates and voter initiatives where, as in the cases just discussed, the focus
is directly on the relative worth of gay people vis-A-vis all others. So, for
example, in the public discourse regarding California's Proposition 8, the primary
(though not the only) question framed for voters was whether the state should
recognize gay couples' relationships via the same marriage rules as different-sex
couples' relationships.35 With that opening, Proposition 8's proponents centered
their campaign on claims about the dangers posed by same-sex couples and gay
individuals, calling not on data but rather on voters' nonanalytical reactions to
these risks.36
Yet not every case that we might think of as implicating the rights of gay
people invites such open discussion regarding intuitions. In two additional cate-
gories of cases, intuitions may be very much at work but hardly at all in sight.
B. Antidiscrimination Doctrine as Applied
In the second category, the baseline question whether gay people can be
subjected to different and worse treatment than nongay people is considered
largely settled (with the answer being that singling out gay people for negative
treatment is impermissible). At issue, instead, is whether a particular set of cir-
cumstances violates that equality premise. So, for example, within weeks after
Romer v. Evans3" rejected a ban on antidiscrimination protections for gay people,
the Seventh Circuit considered whether a middle school student who had been
brutally harassed by his classmates for being gay and not conforming to gender
norms could go to trial with a claim that his equal protection rights had been
35. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 397-98 (Cal. 2008) (framing the legal question that
grew out of the initiative process as whether "our state Constitution prohibits the state from establishing
a statutory scheme ... under which the union of an opposite-sex couple is officially designated a
'marriage' whereas the union of a same-sex couple is officially designated a 'domestic partnership"').
36. At the hearing in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Therese Stewart, Chief Deputy Attorney for the
Plaintiff-Intervenor City and County of San Francisco, argued, "it was against this backdrop [of the
history of discrimination and the demonization of gay people] that Proposition 8's proponents carefully
calibrated their campaign to evoke messages that.., gay relationships are inferior, that they are
immoral, and that the gay agenda will have dire consequences for non-gay people, and especially for
children." Transcript of Record at 47, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. argued
Jan. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Perry Transcript of Record], available at http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/
wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Perry-Vol-1-1-ll-10.pdf; see also Susan Ferriss, Couples Tell of Toll From
State Gay Marriage Ban as Prop. 8 Trial Begins, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 12, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.sacbee.com/politics/story/2454951.html (describing advertisements leading up to the
Proposition 8 vote that suggested that marriage for gay couples is an "evil [that] must be stopped").
37. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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violated.38 The court found it well-established, even then, that the Equal
Protection Clause had long forbidden 'gender-based generalization[s]' in soci-
ety,"39 including those based on sexual orientation, and that there could be no
"rational basis for permitting one student to assault another based on the victim's
sexual orientation."'  The only question in the case, then, was whether the
conduct of the school was sufficiently egregious and linked to the student's
sexual orientation.41
Likewise, where a police officer threatened to disclose the sexual orienta-
tion of a young man he had arrested, the Third Circuit had little difficulty
finding that a privacy right existed. "It is difficult to imagine a more private
matter than one's sexuality and a less likely probability that the government
would have a legitimate interest in disclosure of sexual identity," the court
wrote.42 The central question, instead, was whether the officer's particular action
violated the privacy right.43
Sexual harassment cases involving the targeting of gay people are similar, in
that the law clearly forbids harassment based on sex.' The debatable questions
are thus not whether the law permits differentiation between gay and nongay
people for purposes of harassment but rather whether the conduct at issue was
because of the individual's sex and was severe and pervasive enough to meet
the applicable legal standard.45 For example, in two Ninth Circuit cases, the
court had no difficulty finding that sexual harassment because of gender noncon-
formity and sexual harassment in a same-sex context were impermissible.
38. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454-58 (7th Cir. 1996). The student brought a due proc-
ess claim as well, which the court dismissed on the ground that the school had no duty under the Due
Process Clause to protect him from harms caused by others. Id. at 460.
39. Id. at 455 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975)).
40. See id. at 458.
41. "Nabozny introduced sufficient evidence to show that the discriminatory treatment was moti-
vated by the defendants' disapproval of Nabozny's sexual orientation, including statements by the
defendants that Nabozny should expect to be harassed because he is gay." Id. at 457.
The Sixth Circuit similarly found it "clearly established" that it was impermissible for the state to
take a passenger from one car and put her into another, with a drunk driver who ultimately crashed and
killed her, "solely for the reason that they disapproved of her perceived sexual orientation." Stemler v.
City of Florence, 123 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cit. 1997). The question, then, was whether the passenger's
estate had alleged sufficient facts to show that the equal protection mandate prohibiting selective law
enforcement had been violated in this particular case. Id. The court found that it had. Id.
42. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3rd Cir. 2000). See also id. ("We can,
therefore, readily conclude that Wayman's sexual orientation was an intimate aspect of his personality
entitled to privacy protection.").
43. Id.
44. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding that federal
law prohibiting sex discrimination reaches same-sex sexual harassment).
45. See id. at 81 ("Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always
prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actu-
ally constituted 'discrimina[tion] ... because of... sex."').
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Instead, the question was whether the settled law, as applied, gave rise to
actionable claims. Because the cases involved "systematic" abuse or physical
abuse of a sexual nature, the court found that it did.46
Although sticky intuitions regarding gay people almost surely underlie
the hostility reflected in the harassing conduct and the other acts just mentioned,
the cases focus on applying existing law rather than ferreting out intuitions. As a
result, this set of cases produces fewer illustrations of intuitions at work than
those discussed in Part I.A, in which the central question was whether explicit
sexual-orientation-based distinctions can be maintained. More importantly, it
will be helpful to see that some types of cases, including these application cases,
may be less affected than others by efforts to destabilize rights-blocking
intuitions.
C. Scope of Governmental Authority
The third category encompasses matters related to the state's authority to
prohibit antigay discrimination or recognize same-sex couples' relationships,
and is also one in which intuitions are likely to operate below the radar. In these
situations, the immediate conflict is less about the relative worth of gay people
and more about the scope of a governmental unit's authority to address various
forms of sexual orientation discrimination.
Consider, for example, cases that turn on whether a government official has
the power to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, which arose with some
frequency during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1980, for example, New York City's
mayor issued an executive order that prohibited city contractors from discrimi-
nating against employees based on sexual orientation." Shortly thereafter,
several religiously affiliated social service providers challenged the mayor's
promulgative authority. Yet discussion in the case did not elaborate upon either
the organizations' reasons for wanting to retain their freedom to discriminate
or the mayor's reasons for forbidding discrimination. Instead, the focus was on
the mayor's authority to issue discrimination prohibitions based on traits not
covered by existing law. 48  A similar challenge to a 1982 New Jersey law
46. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(opining that the "physical assault of a sexual nature" by coworkers against an openly gay man amounted to
a "fairly straightforward" sexual harassment case); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that doctrine barring sex stereotyping "squarely precludes" harassment for
failure to conform to sex stereotypes).
47. See Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 1985).
48. Id. at 4 (stating that "the sole issue we address is the extent of the authority in this area of
the chief executive officer of the city, the Mayor, and specifically, whether the executive may forbid
discrimination by city contractors on a ground not covered by any legislative enactment").
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forbidding sexual orientation discrimination likewise focused little attention on
justifications for differentiating between gay and nongay people.49 In the course
of sustaining the law against a suit filed by two churches and a reverend
alleging that the enactment violated their First Amendment rights,"0 the Third
Circuit focused largely on the contours of First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine.5' It never engaged directly with the churches' views regarding the
permissibility of sexual orientation discrimination. 2
More recently, authority-focused challenges have targeted public officials'
recognition of marriage or partnership for same-sex couples. In response to the
San Francisco mayor's authorizing same-sex couples to marry, the California
Supreme Court's full focus was on "an important but relatively narrow legal
issue" regarding the scope of local officials' ministerial duties to enforce the state
marriage law. 3 Likewise, when the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a district
court's decision to broadcast recordings of testimony in the Proposition 8 trial,
it did not address grounds related to the worth of gay people but instead ruled
entirely on the basis of the trial court's failure to follow the proper process for
deviating from governing publicity rules.54
D. Statutory Interpretation
Like the authority cases just discussed, this category encompasses cases
that, in the course of defining or interpreting a statutory term, avoid direct
engagement with justifications for sexual orientation distinctions in law. In
one of the earliest marriage cases, for example, a same-sex couple argued that
the state's authorization of marriage reached their relationships, and the court
responded by invoking the dictionary definition of marriage as between a man
and a woman, as though the dictionary represented the full universe of defini-
tional options.55
49. See Presbytery of N.J. v. Whitman, 99 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 1996).
50. Id. at 103-04.
51. The court also discussed the Pullrmt abstention doctrine at some length in connection with
the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge. Id. at 106-07 (citing R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
52. Id. at 105-06.
53. Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 462 (Cal. 2004); see also Li v.
State, 110 P.3d 91,101 (Or. 2005) (rejecting county issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples as
ultra vires).
54. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 706 (2010) (per curiam).
55. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). The court added: "It appears
to us that appellants are prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refiisal of the
County Court Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their own incapability of
entering into a marriage as that term is defined." Id.
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Illustrative, too, are cases in which individuals have sought standing as
parents to seek custody of, or visitation with, a child they were raising with a
former same-sex partner. Although many jurisdictions have moved to a func-
tional definition of the term "parent" to determine whether an individual has
standing, others have refused. Yet, while denying recognition to a child's second
mother, these courts have not typically acknowledged any of the intuitions about
sexuality or gender that might have influenced their interpretive move."
In these cases, as in the application and authority cases described in Part
I.B and I.C, intuitions are no doubt present, but the central question posed by
the conflict does not require exposure or discussion of them.
1I. THE STICKY INTUITIONS
Whether they are acknowledged or obscured, the intuitions I describe in
this Part are, I argue, largely responsible for ongoing decisions to sustain legal
distinctions based on sexual orientation. They cover a wide range, under my
concededly capacious use of the word "intuition," from sentiments of disgust to
fears of civilization's decline, and much in between. What they share, despite
their differences, is a certain sticking power or resonance notwithstanding the
absence of empirical support and, in some cases, the existence of directly con-
trary empirical data.
As will become apparent, many of the intuitions discussed here overlap and
reinforce each other. Others are in tension. This convergence and divergence
fits with my aim here, which is not to develop a pristine typology but instead to
provide a heuristic for sharpening awareness of the types of intuitions potentially
at work in a given setting. Ultimately, as Part III shows, observing and theorizing
about the complex resistance to sexual orientation equality enables a better-
positioned perspective on the state of the law today and the prospects for change
going forward.
A. Sexual Relations and Disgust
British anthropologist Mary Douglas was the first to analyze systematically
the ways in which human fears of impurity, contagion, and pollution undergird
56. Compare, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651,655 (1991) (holding that "although
petitioner apparently nurtured a close and loving relationship with the child, she is not a parent within the
meaning of [the statute]") and Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 810 (Utah 2007) (refusing to grant parental
status to a lesbian coparent), with, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000) (according
parental status to a functional lesbian parent) and In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 437
(Wis. 1995) (same).
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social taboos.57 She identified, in particular, the ways that human beings seek
to maintain the boundary between themselves and animals and elaborated the
role of disgust in maintaining that boundary.58
Building on her insights, others have shown how emotions of disgust
motivate adverse feelings toward sexuality, and in particular, toward sexual rela-
tions between same-sex couples. Martha Nussbaum, who has written extensively
on the connection between disgust and the regulation of the rights of gay people,
has observed, for example, that "the central locus of disgust in today's United
States [is] male loathing of the male homosexual." 9 Other scholars, too, relate
the disgust triggered by sexual relations between same-sex couples to 'animal-
reminder' disgust... a defense of the distinction between humans and animals."
57. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUILON AND
TABOO (2003).
58. Id. at 169. Reinforcing Douglas's observations by reference to research in psychology and
neuroscience, psychologist Jonathan Haidt, working with colleagues, has explained the move from
concerns with purity and pollution to social norms and moral intuitions by reference to a "purity module"
in the brain:
[C]ulturally widespread concerns with purity and pollution can be traced to a purity module
evolved to deal with the adaptive challenges of life in a world flil of dangerous microbes and
parasites.... Such things, and people who come into contact with them, trigger a fast,
automatic feeling of disgust. Over time, this purity module and its affective output have been
elaborated by many cultures into sets of rules, sometimes quite elaborate, regulating a great many
bodily functions and practices .... Once norms were in place for such practices, violations of
those norms produced negative affective flashes, that is, moral intuitions.
Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph, Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally
Variable Virtues, 133 DAEDALUS 55, 60 (2004).
59. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW
113 (2004). Continuing the point, Nussbaum wrote:
What inspires disgust is typically the male thought of the male homosexual, imagined as anally
penetrable. The idea of semen and feces mixing together inside the body of a male is one of the
most disgusting ideas imaginable-to males, for whom the idea of nonpenetrability is a sacred
boundary against stickiness, ooze, and death .... Thus disgust is ultimately disgust at one's own
imagined penetrability and ooziness, and this is why the male homosexual is both regarded with
disgust and viewed with fear as a predator who might make everyone else disgusting.
Id.
By contrast, Nussbaum wrote that "[flemale homosexuals may be objects of fear, or moral indignation,
or generalized anxiety, but they are less often objects of disgust." Id. As discussed infra, even assuming
Professor Nussbaum is correct in her differentiation of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, a point on
which I generally agree, the differentiation does not eliminate the force of other intuitions related to
lesbians, as well as to lesbians and gay men collectively, in reinforcing regulations that burden gay
people. On this point, see also Case, supra note 34, at 119 (stating, in connection with a review of
Nussbaum's newest book on the subject, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
ANDCONSTrTUTIONAL LAW (2010), that"all opposition to gay rights cannot be reduced to disgust").
60. Jonathan Haidt et al., Body, Psyche, and Culture: The Releaionship Between Disgust and Morality,
9 PSYCHOL. & DEVELOPING SOCIETIES 107, 113-15 (1997) (claiming that "most human societies place
taboo on many of the possible pairings of partners (and... sexual acts)" to establish a concrete delineation
between human and animal).
William Eskridge has described a "Constitution of (Anti-Homosexual)
Disgust and Contagion" as the embodiment of these sentiments.61 To support
this constitutional claim, he reviewed a range of judicial decisions sustaining
restrictions on the rights of gay people, from Bowers v. Hardwick62 to numerous
circuit court decisions, arguing that they can best be understood by reference to
disgust toward "homosexual sex." 3 Applying the disgust framework specifically
to disputes regarding marriage rights, others have likewise concluded that dis-
gust toward homosexuality lies at the root of current conflicts.' As one scholar
has written, "the moral emotion of many that homosexual behavior is disgusting
and therefore immoral" drives the opposition toward marriage and parenting
rights for same-sex couples.6"
61. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and
Contagion, 57 U. FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1023 (2005). Elaborating the contours of this disgust in ways simi-
lar to Nussbaum, Eskridge drew on the psychological literature just discussed, and reviewed its application
to sexuality generally and to anal sex in particular.
Almost anything related to sex is disgusting to some people; some sexual practices are disgusting
to almost all people; and almost all people feel their disgust intensely. Although most people
engage in oral sex, and many in anal sex, a lot of Americans find these activities dis-
gusting.... Because male homosexuality (and, quite irrationally, female homosexuality as
well) is deeply associated with anal sex, it has long been disgusting to Americans. And their
disgust-driven view that homosexual sex is immoral has persisted (even if at reduced levels) as
the majority view during the twentieth century.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Notably, Eskridge also identified the social group associated with the despised sexual relations
("disgusting homosexual sodomites") as the targets of this jurisprudential disgust. Id. at 1013; see also
Richard E. Redding, It's Really About Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay Parenting, and the Psychology of
Disgust, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 127, 186 (2008) ("[Blecause they find it disgusting, many people
will reject homosexuality and will not want children to be 'contaminated' by lesbigay parents."). I will
return to "disgusting" actors, as distinguished from "disgusting" acts, in Part II.G infra.
62. 478 U.S. 186(1986).
63. See Eskridge, supra note 61; see also Redding, supra note 61, at 187 ("Gay anal sex may be an
especially strong source of disgust because bodily contact with fecal material, in particular, gives rise to
disgust. .. 'Homophobic disgust' may then involve concerns about bodily products, such as blood and
semen, and their potential for disease consequence." (quoting Bunmi 0. Olatunji & Craig N. Sawchuk,
Disgust: Characteristic Features, Social Manifestations, and Clinical Implications, 24 J. SOC. & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL 932,946 (2005))).
64. See Marc. R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the Kulturkampf: Why
Federalism Is Not the Main Event, 17 TEMp. POL & C.R. L. REv. 387,414 (2008) (discussing "the dimen-
sions of pollution claims, including moral and spiritual pollution as well as physical pollution"); Redding,
supra note 61, passim. In addition, although Nussbaum has made an extended case for the elimination
of disgust-based arguments from the set of permissible reasons for public persuasion, these arguments
continue to be made and to exert a powerful effect in public discourse and decisionmaking. See Andrew
Sullivan, Proving Animus, ATLANTIC, Jan. 14, 2010, http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the
dailyslish/2010/01/proving-animus.html.
65. Redding, supra note 61, at 192-93.
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Related to this is the hypersexualization of gay people, relative to hetero-
sexuals, in the public imagination. 66 That is, sexual acts are often treated as the
defining feature of being gay.67 To the extent that sexual acts between same-sex
couples provoke disgust reactions, then, the sexualization of gay people in the
public mind likely heightens the power and effect of disgust in conflicts regarding
gay people's rights.'e
In short, when we compile the list of intuitions and related senses of things
that underlie the imposition of legal restrictions on the lives of gay people, a
deep-rooted disgust toward sex acts between same-sex couples unquestionably
was and still remains an important one, as the extensive discussion and docu-
mentation of it suggest.
B. Sexual Orientation Insecurity
Sexual orientation insecurity' is closely related to disgust regarding homo-
sexuality. Individuals who are insecure about their sexual orientation are typi-
cally discomfited not because they believe themselves to be heterosexual but
rather because they feel they are not." And while some of that insecurity is
presumably attributable to social disapprobation of gay people, some may also be
associated with the sorts of disgust related to the sex acts just discussed.7'
66. JONATHAN KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY 74 (1995) (summarizing Freud's
assertion that "[a flully developed heterosexual is the standard against which the homosexual is always
judged and found fixated").
67. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (characterizing sodomy as "the
conduct that defines the class" of gay people).
68. For example, during an executive session discussing repeal of legislation granting marriage to
same-sex couples in New Hampshire, State Rep. Nancy Elliot made several antigay statements about anal
sex, likening it to "wriggling... in excrement" and stating that "[t]hey" are "teaching [anal sex to fifth
graders] in the public school." Nancy EUiott, Anti-Gay Lawmaker, Describes Anal Sex During Public
Hearing: 'Wriggling' Around 'In E=rement', HUFFINGiTON PcT, Feb. 12, 2010, hrtp://www.huffington
post.com/2010/02/12/nancy-elliott-anti-gay-ne._n_460544.html; cf. James Allon Garland, Breaking the
Enigma Code: Why the Law Has Failed to Recognize Sex as Expressive Conduct Under the First Amendment,
and Why Sex Between Men Proves That It Should, 12 LAw & SEXUALfTY 159, 253-54 (2003) (arguing that
"the popularity of the phrase 'the love that dares not speak its name' as a reference for homosexuality is just
one measure of how even sexual minorities have been profoundly taught not to be comfortable verbally
articulating manifestations of same-sex desire").
69. 1 distinguish this from insecurity about gender roles and norms, which I discuss infra Part 1.G.
70. Cf. Robb Wilier, Overdoing Gender. A Test of the Masculine Overcompensation Thesis 1
(unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Am. Sociological Ass'n, 2005), available at
http://willer.berkeley.edu/WillerOverdoingGender.pdf (reporting on a study in which "men given feedback
threatening their masculinity ... expressed more negative attitudes towards homosexuals").
71. Again, as noted in the previous discussion, many people, gay and nongay alike, engage in the
acts of oral and anal sex that provoke disgust emotions. In the public's mind, however, anal sex, in
particular, is most typically associated with gay men. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
Although sexual orientation insecurity is probably better characterized as a
sense of oneself rather than as an intuition, it has a similar capacity to motivate
judgments about and conduct toward others. At times, sexual orientation inse-
curity has been linked to bias crimes, where assailants' anxiety about their own
sexual orientation motivates them to attack others they know to be gay. As one
expert observed, "[bly beating a homosexual or someone they perceive as a
homosexual, they are trying to deal with their sexual insecurity."" Sexual orien-
tation insecurity has similarly been invoked in support of the gay panic defense,
which, although it is now received skeptically by many courts, has a history of
successful use by defendants charged with having committed a violent crime
against someone of the same sex who made, or was perceived to have made, a
sexual advance.73 The theory of the defense is that a sexual solicitation by
someone of the same sex "can cause a latently gay defendant to 'panic,' to
become temporarily unable to distinguish right from wrong, and to severely beat
or kill the solicitor."74 By invoking this defense, "the defendant claims that his
culpability should be mitigated both by the fact that the victim triggered the
violent reaction and by the fact that the reaction itself was uncontrollable."75
Although most individuals who are insecure about their own sexual
orientation will not translate that discomfort into violent acts, it would be unrea-
sonable to think their insecurity has no consequence whatsoever. Indeed, the
theory behind the outing movement, which sought to expose as gay some elected
officials who had not come out, was that the closeted individuals had allowed
their insecurity about being gay to lead them to take antigay positions in public.
76
A related intuition is closely tied to Mary Douglas's observations about
contagion. Here, the belief is that homosexuality is something that can be
72. Lisa Gelhaus, Gay-Bashing Victims Overcome Prejudice to Win Civil Settlements, TRIAL MAG.,
Feb. 1, 1999, at 14, 17 (quoting bias crimes expert Brian Levin).
73. See Kara S. Suffredini, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD
WORLD LJ. 279, 287 (2001). Suffredini added that the gay panic defense "has proven successful even
when the victim's triggering action was as slight 'as a nonviolent verbal or gestural solicitation."' Id. at
287-88 (quoting Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System:
Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497,499 (1984)).
74. Id. at 287.
75. Id. at 288.
76. To be clear, not every political actor outed in these efforts was insecure about his sexual
orientation. (I use "his" advisedly; most outing of elected officials has focused on men. In the media and
entertainment worlds, women as well as men have been the target of outing campaigns.) For some of those
outed, the insecurity was less about their own sexual orientation and more related to efforts to avoid
public disapproval for being gay. See generally LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS
AND ETHICS OF OUTING (1993); WARREN JOHANSSON & WILLIAM A. PERCY, OUTING:
SHATTERING THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE (1994). For one of the foundational analyses and defenses
of outing, see MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, QUEER IN AMERICA: SEX, THE MEDIA, AND THE CLOSETS OF
POWER (1993).
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caught from others or transmitted by law and the surrounding society. That is, if
being gay becomes the legal and social equivalent of being heterosexual, then
the intuition is that those who are currently working to keep themselves on the
heterosexual side of the fence will no longer feel so constrained." Within this
strand of thought is a distinct concern that men will no longer be as susceptible
to the domesticating influence of women. 8
Thus, when we consider the barriers to changing views regarding the legal
relevance of sexual orientation, we ought to take into account that those who
feel insecure about their sexual orientation (or the sexual orientation of others)
may be especially resistant to equality claims by lesbians and gay men.79 Indeed,
unlike some of the disgust intuitions described above, concerns with contagion of
this sort have been directly engaged within adjudication. One staple of early
custody and visitation litigation on behalf of lesbian and gay parents was
addressed specifically to this point, making the argument that the sexual orien-
tation of parents did not determine the sexual orientation of children.'
C. Sexual Predation
Interestingly, the intuitive link between gay men and the sexual predation
of minors is one that, while powerful in past decades, appears to have weakened
77. The National Association of Research and Treatment of Homosexuality (NARTH), an
organization that condones treatment to alter "unwanted homosexual attraction," alleges that the simple
act of "teach[ing] our children that homosexuality is as normal and healthy as heterosexuality" may have
devastating consequences:
Scientific research supports age-old cultural norms that homosexuality is not a healthy, natural
alternative to heterosexuality... It does far more harm than good to tell a teenager that his or her
attractions toward members of the same sex are normal and desirable. Teens in this position
need understanding and counseling, not a push in the direction of a potentially deadly lifestyle.
National Association for Research & Therapy of Homosexuality, The Three Myths About
Homosexuality, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.narth.com/menus/myths.html.
78. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA.
L. REV. 773, 791 (2002) (claiming that the "larger purpose of marriage is to encourage the behavior that
gives fathers to children and male support to mothers" and that the legal recognition of same-sex couples'
marriages will undermine these important social needs).
79. See Transcript of Record at 387, Evans v. Romer, Civ. A. No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586
(D. Colo. Dec. 14, 1993) (testimony of Dr. Judd Marmor) (discussing sexual orientation insecurity as a
source of antigay bias).
80. See David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in
the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 535 (1999) ("During the late 1970s, the first mental health
research on the well-being of children raised by lesbian mothers was published. Using expert witnesses,
advocates were in a better position to dispel recurring myths about lesbians as mothers-[including] that
children raised by lesbian mothers would probably become gay or lesbian, would be confused about their
gender identity, would be socially stigmatized, or would suffer other psychological harm." (citing Donna
Hitchens & Barbara Price, Trial Strategy in Lesbian Mother Custody Cases: The Use of Expert Testimony, 9
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 451 (1978))).
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in influence in response to strong empirical evidence to the contrary. Here, the
argument is that gay people (particularly men) pose a particular risk to children
because their undisciplined sexuality leads them to disregard age-related norms
regarding sexual relationships."
Today, even where one might most expect to see the "gay people as sexual
predators" argument, as in cases where adult-child relationships are directly at
issue, the argument is not made in mainstream fora." Notable too is the failure of
states and others to contest expert testimony on the issue. In Romer v. Evans, 3
for example, an expert witness testified specifically to rebut any assumptions or
intuitions about child sexual abuse being committed disproportionately by gay
people, and the state of Colorado did not substantively contest her claims.'
Yet the appeal to intuitions and related fears about gay people as sexual
predators has not disappeared entirely. Indeed, during California's Proposition 8
trial, one of the defendant-intervenors admitted that he had circulated a letter as
part of his campaign to support the measure in which he wrote that gay people
would use the right to marry as a stepping stone toward legalizing pedo-
philia 5 "On their agenda list is legalizing having sex with children," the
letter claimed.'s
Still, given that this argument has gone largely out of mainstream circula-
tion, it might be instructive for those considering strategies to challenge the
other, stickier intuitions to think about what prompted the shift with this one.
81. See, e.g., PAUL CAMERON, FAMILY RESEARCH INST., HOMOSEXUALITY AND CHILD
MOLESTATION, available at http://www.familyresearchinst.org/2009/02/child-molestation-and-
homosexuality-2 (2009) (arguing that "the gay movement is forthright about seeking to legitimize
child-adult homosexual sex" and that "there is a strong, disproportionate association between child
molestation and homosexuality"); see also DEB PRICE & JOYCE MURDOCH, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY
MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 202 (2001) (quoting Anita Bryant's Save Our Children
campaign's warning that "[tIhe recruitment of our children is absolutely necessary for the survival and
growth of homosexuality. Since homosexuals cannot reproduce, they must recruit, must freshen their
ranks"); cf. Gregory Herek, Paul Cameron Bio and Fact Sheet, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/
html/factscameron_sheet.html (last visited June 4, 2010) (reporting that the American Psychological
Association, the American Sociological Association, and other professional organizations have formally
disassociated themselves from Cameron because of his misrepresentation of sexuality-related research).
82. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (considering the Boy Scouts' ban on
openly gay adult leaders); Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton II), 377 F-3d 1275,
1276 (11 th Cir. 2004) (evaluating Florida's ban on adoption by lesbian and gay prospective parents).
83. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
84. LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL
60 (1998).
85. Perry Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 1926, avaiable at http://www.equalrightsfoundation
.org/ wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Perry-Vol-8-1-21-10.pdf (direct examination of Defendant-Intervenor
Dr. Hak-Shing William Tam).
86. Id.
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D. Disintegration of the Social Order
In defending Britain's ban on sex between men, 7 Lord Patrick Devlin
gained fame, or notoriety, by claiming that maintenance of the ban was necessary
to prevent the decline of civilization.8 While few today are as committed as
Devlin was to the position that the disappearance of sodomy laws would desta-
bilize civilized society, many, especially in connection with marriage, harbor deep
concerns that society will suffer if homosexuality and heterosexuality are treated
as legally fungible.89
Within this intuition, several concerns are arguably at work. One, which
I will address in Part II.G below, is that the neutering of sexual orientation
differences will also result in the neutering of gender differences. The second is
linked to fears of a literal decline in civilization as a consequence of the moral
failings of a society that accepts homosexuality on the same terms as heterosexu-
ality. Think of the biblical city of Sodom, which reportedly lost all sense of
restraint, including with respect to sexual relations between same-sex couples,
precipitating its own destruction.9" Similarly, the dramatic decline and fall of
Rome is associated in public discourse with excess and debauchery that included
sexual couplings among men."
Even if the historical record belies these associations of societal decline with
the acceptance of homosexuality, there is no doubt that some powerful
participants in the public discourse continue to harbor these views. Consider,
87. Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, § 61 (Eng.) (providing that
the crime of "buggery" receive a sentence of at least ten years).
88. LORD PATRiCK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS, at vi-vii (1965).
89. Intuitions regarding the causal relationship between nondiscriminatory acceptance of
homosexuality and the decline of civilization have been expressly affirmed outside the United States as
well. In Uganda, for example, a conflict has roiled regarding a proposed measure that would impose
severe criminal penalties, including the death penalty, on individuals found to be gay and those who have
engaged in sexual relations with a same-sex partner. The proposed bill is widely regarded as supporting
expansive violence against lesbians and gay men because it imposes criminal penalties on those who do
not report their knowledge of "homosexual activity" within twenty-four hours. Much of the advocacy in
favor of the bill has focused on the dangers that homosexuality presents to Ugandan society. See Zoe
Alsop, Uganda's Anti-Gay Bill: Inspired by the U.S., TIME, Dec. 10, 2009, at 1, available at http://
www.time.con/time/world/article/0,8599,1946645,00.html.
For earlier, related concerns in the context of the threat to civilization posed by bigamy, see, for
example, Reynolds v. Sims, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (advocating that limitation of marriage to two-person
couples is necessary to maintain a nondespotic state).
90. See Genesis 19:1-29. I will not join the debate among religious scholars regarding what actually
happened in Sodom and Gomorrah, where some have argued that the problems were not so much about
sexual relations as about hostility between neighbors. For purposes here, the more important point is that,
regardless of interpretive accuracy, the story of the two cities is widely seen among a broad segment of
American society as a biblical rebuke of homosexuality.
91. See, e.g., JIM NELSON BLACK, WHEN NATIONS DIE (1994).
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for example, the well-publicized statements of evangelical minister Pat
Robertson, who frequently preaches that tolerance of homosexuality will lead
to the degradation and destruction of civilized society.92 Although these
statements have been the target of criticism and ridicule, 93 we would be remiss
to think they have no resonance for Robertson's many followers.
In addition to concerns about catastrophic events, there exist subtler,
though no less powerful intuitions regarding the mutually constitutive rela-
tionship among legal rules, moral rules, and societal well-being. Among these
are fears that ending the legal privileging of heterosexuality will cause a decline
in public morals that, in turn, will cause societal harm. Put another way, if
the law permits same-sex couples to engage in sexual intimacy free from
punishment and to marry each other on the same basis as different-sex couples,
the extant moral disapproval of homosexuality will be undermined, and the
surrounding society will lose its foundational moral compass. For example,
the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, an organization opposed to
marriage for same-sex couples, has stated that "[w]hen family diversity moves
from a principle of compassion for those in difficult circumstances, to posi-
tioning itself as a core moral ideal for family life, it fundamentally asks law and
society to take the side of unencumbered adult individualism over the needs of
our own children."
94
A third concern draws on the ideas of John Finnis and other natural law
scholars. Here the point is that there are basic human goods and acts that
contribute to them, including the coupling of a married man and woman that is
92. On the Christian television program the "700 Club," Robertson said: "Sodomy--in all
history, as far as I can tell, any nation that embraces this so-called 'lifestyle' and legalizes it, celebrates it,
protects it is on the ash can of history. Every single one has gone into decline. There's not one that
survived since this happens." 700 Club (Christian Broadcasting Network broadcast June 16, 2008).
Robertson expressed similar views after Maine legalized marriage for same-sex couples in 2009:
[Ihf we take biblical standards away in homosexuality, what about... bestiality and ultimately
what about child molestation and pedophilia? How can we criminalize these things and at the
same time have constitutional amendments allowing same-sex marriage among homosexuals.
You mark my words, this is just the beginning in a long downward slide in relation to all the
things that we consider to be abhorrent.
Pat Robertson Sugests "Ulmate Conclusion" of Legal Same-Sex Marriage Is Legal Polygamy, Bestiality, Child
Molestation, Pedophilia (Christian Broadcasting Network television broadcast May 7, 2009), available at
http://mediamatters.orglmmtv/200905070024.
93. See, e.g., Claire Shipman & Devin Dwyer, White House Adviser Valerie Jarrett 'Speechless'
Over Pat Robertson's Haiti Comment, ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 14, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/
HaitiEarthquake/white-house-advisor-valerie-jarrett-speechless-pat-robertson/srory?id=95557 14.
94. INST. FOR AM. VALUES & INST. FOR MARRIAGE & PUB. POLICY, MARRIAGE AND THE
LAw: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 11 (2006), available at http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/
imapp.mlawstmnt.pdf.
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open to procreation.9 In this view, any acts that do not fit within the basic
human goods paradigm are harmful to social welfare. To the extent the law
facilitates these harmful acts, it contributes to this set of social injuries.
Along these lines, an additional concern is that full acceptance of
homosexuality will destabilize the family in ways that are also harmful to
civilization. Notwithstanding the growing acknowledgment that families
have generally not lived up to their reputation as secure, supportive shelters from
the storms of the workaday world,96 the vision of the family as a protected enclave
remains powerful in many quarters.9 Although even the most traditional
families have had gay members, there would be, on this view, a substantial desta-
bilization of tradition if being gay were treated as equally praiseworthy as being
heterosexual. The traditional family, with its aspirations of a mother, father, and
children together as a unit secured against the world, would no longer be any
more valid than the gay individual or the same-sex couple, with or without
children, next door. And this shift, the intuition suggests, could cause
untold harm to the social fabric. The next Subpart's discussion of the "end of
monogamy" intuition is a piece of this; other concerns relate to gender role
insecurity that is discussed below in Part II.G.
All of these intuitions might be described as expressing Burkean concerns
about the unforeseeable consequences of social change. As Edmund Burke
explained, albeit with respect to changes in political structure, there are substan-
tial risks associated with abandoning what has been known for generations.
With change that is insufficiently respectful of longstanding traditions, "the
whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth [c]ould be broken. No one
generation could link with the other," he wrote.98
This concern about destabilizing tradition fits directly with the Supreme
Court's own jurisprudence that treats the family, and in particular, the marital
couple, as a cornerstone of civilization. This view, first articulated by the Court
in the late 1880s but confirmed repeatedly in recent decades, characterizes
95. See generally John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation", 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1049 (1994).
96. See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND
THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992) (advancing a critical analysis of myths about American family life).
97. See, for example, the Alliance Defense Fund's statement regarding the protection of family
values: "The family is the most basic unit of any society or nation. Without healthy, functioning
families, a culture cannot survive." Alliance Defense Fund, Protecting Family Values, http://www.
alliancedefensefund.org/issues/traditionalfamily/Default.aspx (last visited June 20, 2010).
98. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 259 (J.C.D. Clark ed.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790).
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marriage as "the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress. ' 9
For challenges to this particular intuitive link between "traditional" families
and social stability, one might look, for example, to historians' engagement in
the struggle for marriage equality. Their amicus briefs and testimony in marriage
cases, in particular, review myriad examples of the ways in which marriage has
changed over time, even while remaining a vital force in society. These submis-
sions aim to show that changes to tradition are the norm, rather than posing the
dangers the intuition would suggest.' 9 Their opinion essays and interventions
in the public discourse have likewise sought to disrupt this intuition's power.101
Still, invocations of tradition are made regularly by both courts and
others to defend the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage as well as other
restrictions on the rights of lesbians and gay men.' 2 And behind these invoca-
tions, presumably, is the intuition that if tradition is disregarded, civilization
will suffer as a result.
99. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888)). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(describing "the traditional relation of the family" as "a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire
civilization"); Skinner v. Oklahomaexrel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942) (describing marriage and
procreation as "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race").
100. See, e.g., Brief of the Professors of the History of Marriage, Families, and the Law, Lewis v.
Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. A-2244-03T5); Suzanne B. Goldberg, A Historical Guide to the
Future of Marriage for Sane-Sex Couples, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 249, 254-72 (2006) (presenting
the historians' amicus brief in the New York marriage litigation); see also Perry Transcript of Record,
supra note 36, at 220-52, available at http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/
2010-01-12-Perry-Trial-Day-02-Cott-direct-cross-redirect-Chauncey-direct-cross-mini.pdf (direct
examination of Nancy Cott, testifying that marriage is constantly evolving and has changed from an
institution that once embraced racial and national origin restrictions, and "restrictions on American
women's citizenship rights"); id. at 440 (direct examination of George Chauncey, testifying that the
"Reverend Jerry Falwell himself preached a sermon in 1958 criticizing the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board
of Education decision as going against God's will and warning, actually, that it could lead to interracial
marriage .... ").
101. See, e.g., Stephanie Coontz, Op-Ed, Taking Marriage Private, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2007, at
A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/opinion/26coontz.html?-r= I&em&ex= 119622
6000&en=5e70532fce256fe0&ei=5087%OA.
102. See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 222 (N.J. 2006) (embracing the different-sex marriage
rule as "the definition that has reigned for centuries"); id. ("We cannot escape the reality that the shared
societal meaning of marriage-passed down through the common law into our statutory law-has always
been the union of a man and a woman. To alter that meaning would render a profound change in the
public consciousness of a social institution of ancient origin."); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of Dept. of
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 820 (Lofion 1) (11th Cir. 2004) (invoking "the accumulated
wisdom of several millennia of human experience"); Brief of Defendant-Appellees with Appendix at 54,
Kerrigan v. Connecticut, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (No. 17716) (arguing that "[iut is entirely rational for
the legislature to retain the term 'marriage' to describe the union of one man and one woman because
that is the definition of marriage that has always existed in Connecticut throughout its history"); cf. Bowers
v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ('To hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.").
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E. The End of Monogamy
One particular intuition associated with the decline of civilization is that
increased acceptance of homosexuality will lead to a decline in monogamous
relationships.1 3 The underpinnings of this intuition are likely twofold. In part,
there is a widespread view, confirmed by some research (and contested by other
studies), that men are more inclined toward sexual promiscuity." This view
surfaced as a partial justification for Colorado's ban on discrimination protec-
tions for gay people, with one witness highlighting the view that male couples
were less likely to be monogamous in their relationships than male-female or
female-female couples.05
Reinforcing this is another intuition that if the preference for heterosexu-
ality is abandoned, nonmonogamy will be seen increasingly as a viable option."'
This is not to say that nonmonogamy is not seen as viable today, particularly
for people not in committed relationships. Instead, the point here is that
moving away from constraints on same-sex coupling and from marriage as it
has traditionally been configured will impede the embrace of monogamy.
Extending this view further, the intuition would be that without monogamy, we
103. Underlying this intuition is the assumption that monogamy is preferable to nonmonogamy.
Although there have been many challenges to the desirability of monogamy, it remains the case that most
people, when asked, indicate that they would prefer monogamy within long-term relationships. Justin
P. Nichols, The Hidden Dichotomy in the Law of Morality, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591, 606 n.114 (2009)
(citing statistics that show about 60 to 70 percent of people report preferring monogamy and that there
is not a significant difference in instances of monogamy based on sexual orientation). For arguments
against the normative preference for monogamy, see, for example, Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's
Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Edsstence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Sc. CHANGE 277 (2004);
Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
181 (2001).
104. See generally Roy F. Baumeister, Kathleen R. Catanese, & Kathleen D. Vohs, Is There a Gender
Difference in Strength of Sex Drive? Theoretical Views, Conceptual Distinctions, and a Review of Relevant
Evidence, 5 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2001); Dorothy Einon, Are Men More
Promiscuous Than Women?, 15 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 131 (1994).
105. See Suzanne Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality, and the
Trial of Amendment 2, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1057, 1078 (1994) (citing testimony of Robert Knight,
Director of Cultural Research Studies at the Family Research Council).
106. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 78, at 790-91 ("When the law assumes and promulgates the
idea that either mothers or fathers are dispensable, and that marriage is an essentially private matter
whose form is determined by private adult desires, marriage in general, and children in particular, will
inevitably suffer.").
In a thought experiment about society without marriage, Elizabeth Scott has explored the question
whether expectations of fidelity in relationships would be as strong within civil unions as within
marriage. See Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. LQ. 537,563-64 (2007).
not only risk undermining relationships, but per the discussion in Part II.D
above, we also risk the decline of civilization.
10 7
F. Children
Surely one of the stickiest and most powerful intuitions that has led deci-
sionmakers to maintain sexual orientation's legal relevance is the sense that if
there is no societal preference for heterosexuality, more children will grow up to
be gay or, if not gay themselves, to have an attitude of indifference toward sexual
orientation differences. Indeed, supporters of antigay measures in public initia-
tive and referenda efforts often stress that children will be harmed if the state
embraces nondiscrimination with respect to sexual orientation or does not
favor heterosexuals in marriage and family law. As one advertisement used in
California's Proposition 8 campaign asserted, for example, "when Massachusetts
legalized gay marriage, schools began teaching second graders that boys can
marry boys." ' This appeal to child-centered fears and intuitions has its roots in
one of the early contemporary antigay grassroots efforts, in which Anita Bryant
led the charge to repeal Dade County's sexual orientation antidiscrimination
ordinance with a campaign theme of "Save Our Children.""
Similar intuitions have likely been at work where school boards have
denied recognition to student organizations that seek to foster understanding and
acceptance of sexual orientation differences"' and where school officials have
barred students from taking a same-sex date to the school prom."'
107. The U.S. Supreme Court articulated this concern forcefully when addressing the permissibility
of polygamy, describing monogamous marriage as the foundation for civilized society. Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878) ("Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required
to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the
principles on which the government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests."). Invoking Professor
Francis Lieber's commentary, the Court added that "polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and which,
when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot
long exist in connection with monogamy." Id. at 166. Professor Lieber expressed this idea within the
debate regarding Utah's statehood. See, e.g., Francis Lieber, The Mormons: Shall Utah Be Admitted Into
the Union?, 5 PurNAM'S MONTHLY 225, 234 (1855).
108. ProtectMarriage.com, It's Already Happened, http://www.protectmarriage.com/video/view/5
(last visited June 4, 2010) (arguing that legalizing marriage for same-sex couples in California would
undermine parents' rights to protect their children from certain forms of information). For additional
discussion of advertising in the Proposition 8 campaign related to children and families, see generally
Murray, supra note 22.
109. See Eskridge, supra note 61, at 1015-18 (providing a detailed description of Bryant's successful
repeal effort).
110. See, e.g., Gay-Straight Alliance of Okeechobee High Sch. v. Sch. Bd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 1224,
1229 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (evaluating a school district's decision to prohibit the formation of a student group
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These intuitions regarding harm to children from growing up in an envi-
ronment in which sexual-orientation-based distinctions are treated as legally
irrelevant have numerous component parts. I will draw out several here.
1. Contagion and Suggestibility
Surely the disgust reaction discussed above in Part II.A, as well as fears
regarding civilization's survival discussed in Part I.D, contribute to intuitive
concerns about harm to children from growing up in nondiscriminatory envi-
ronments. But several other intuitions may also be at work.
One is that the surrounding environment has the capacity to influence the
development of children's sexual orientation. In part, the intuition is that
the presence of openly gay adults might lead youth to become gay."2 A related
intuition-that gay-friendly laws or communities will result in more gay youth-
assumes that sexual orientation is responsive to messages of acceptance or
hostility from the surrounding environment."' Some who hold this intuition no
doubt believe that all gay individuals, including youth, are capable of changing
their sexual orientation."' Others focus particularly on the impressionability of
aimed at "provid[ing] a safe, supportive environment for students and to promote tolerance and
acceptance of one another, regardless of sexual orientation").
111. See Kelli Gauthier, Schools Face Issue of Gay Prom Dates, CHAT1ANCXOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Apr. 25, 2009, available at http://www.timesfreepress.comnews/2009/apr/25/schools-face-issue-gay-prom-
dates/ (discussing controversy over same-sex dates at school proms); cf. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp.
381,387 (D.R.l. 1980) (rejecting argument of school principal that a student's bringing a same-sex date
to the school prom would cause serious disruption and harm).
112. The Kansas Court of Appeals raised a related concern in connection with the prosecution of an
eighteen-year-old for engaging in consensual oral sex with a fourteen-year-old where the defendant was
sentenced to 206 months rather than six months imprisonment because his sexual partner was a teenage
boy rather than a teenage girl. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 232, 236, 239-40 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd,
122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). The court wrote:
mraditional sexual mores have played a significant role in the sexual development of children.
During early adolescence, children are in the process of trying to figure out who they are. A
part of that process is learning and developing their sexual identity. As a result, the legislature
could well have concluded that homosexual sodomy between children and young adults could
disturb the traditional sexual development of children.
Id. at 236. A somewhat similar role-modeling intuition led a youth organization to fire an adult leader who
became pregnant out of wedlock on the theory that the leader would make the youth members more
susceptible to becoming pregnant out of wedlock as well. See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 840
F.2d 583 (8th Cit. 1988).
113. Another possible intuition is that hostile messages from the surrounding environment will not
reshape an individual's sexual orientation but might deter a gay person from identifying as gay or entering
into a same-sex parmership.
114. See, e.g., Charles W. Socarides, How America Went Gay, AMERICA, Nov. 18,1995, at 20-22
(challenging the idea that homosexuality is innate); see also National Association for the Research &
Therapy of Homosexuality, http://www.narth.com (last visited June 4, 2010); Parents and Friends of Ex-
Gays & Gays, http://pfox.org (last visited June 4, 2010).
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youth, "5 with the accompanying intuition that these young people are more
likely to become heterosexual in a world in which heterosexuality is legally and
socially privileged." 6
Advocates have taken up this particular intuition, typically with expert
witnesses and amicus briefing from psychologists, including the American
Psychological Association, to make the point that sexual orientation is set in
place at an early age and is highly resistant to change."7
2. Shifting Morality
In addition to intuitions that youth will be influenced into becoming gay by
virtue of their exposure to a gay-friendly environment, a separate, though
related, intuition concerns mores and attitudes. The intuition here is that an
environment that rejects discrimination against gay people will produce more
people who see sexual orientation differences as benign variation rather than as a
problem warranting moral disapproval and legal regulation.
Put another way, the equation of heterosexuality and homosexuality risks
producing a generation at risk of losing its moral compass, on this view. In 2005,
for example, the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld the application of a criminal
115. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 100-01 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting, in the context of
parents' lawsuit challenging curriculum materials aimed to encourage acceptance of gay people, that the
impressionability of young children is a relevant factor); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,
353 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (describing some studies that "suggest the possibility that public policies which can
be seen as positively endorsing homosexuality, in contrast with policies more clearly limited simply to
forbidding discrimination against homosexuals, may have some bearing on how free an impressionable
youth may feel to engage in homosexual experiences, if not to assume that orientation").
116. Along these lines, many adults, including those who oppose sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, would prefer for their children to be heterosexual, on the view that, apart from moral or religious
concerns, it is easier to live as a straight person than as a gay person. While there are particular challenges
associated with being a member of any minority group, including one targeted for disapproval and
hostility, as gay people often are, this sense that being heterosexual equates with a better life is little
more than an intuition as well. Indeed, the mainstream view of researchers is that sexual orientation is
not a predictor of either happiness or mental health. See Gregory M. Herek & Linda D. Garnets, Sexual
Orientation and Mental Health, 3 ANN. REV. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 353, 353-75 (2007) (examining
recent empirical research on the mental well-being of gays and lesbians). Efforts to change an individ-
ual's sexual orientation from gay or bisexual to heterosexual, by contrast, have largely been associated
with negative mental health outcomes. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THERAPIES FOCUSED ON
ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE SEXUAL ORIENTATION (2000), available at http:llwww.psych.org/Departments/
EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/PositionStatements/200001a.aspx (reaffirming the
Association's view that "homosexuality per se is not a diagnosable mental disorder," arguing that
techniques that purport to be able to change an individual's sexual orientation "are often guided not by
rigorous scientific or psychiatric research," and cautioning that "anecdotal reports of 'cures' [for
homosexuality] are counterbalanced by anecdotal claims of psychological harm").
117. See KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 84, at 26; Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Psychological
Ass'n in Support of Respondent, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699), 2000
WL 339884.
sodomy law that imposed significantly greater punishment on same-sex couples
than different-sex couples. The decision, which was ultimately reversed by the
Kansas Supreme Court, found that one rational basis for the law was to "protect[ ]
and preserv[e] the traditional sexual mores of society and the historical sexual
development of children."' 1
8
Under this kind of reasoning, even if school and youth organization leaders
do not subscribe to the intuition that a youth is likely to be influenced by others
toward being gay, they might well embrace sexual-orientation-based regulation
as a means to preserve and reinforce their moral vision. The Boy Scouts' exclu-
sion of openly gay leaders can be understood as reflecting these instincts,"9 as can
the school-based restrictions on gay-straight alliances discussed above.
G. Gender Insecurity
A final area that is rife with intuitive concerns triggered by legal regulation
of sexual orientation relates to gender roles. One of these intuitions reflects a
concern that if sexual orientation distinctions are disavowed by the law and
surrounding society, gender differences will be next to go. In part, this sense that
gay people endanger gender norms stems from the view that engaging in
intimate relationships with same-sex partners is not something men or women
should do.2 But gay individuals often fail to conform to gendered expectations
regarding self-presentation as well. At times, there are reactions against lesbians
who express themselves in nonfeminine ways, as in instances where graduating
high school students have been barred from taking their class photograph in a
suit or from wearing a tuxedo to a school prom.' There are also strong reac-
tions, sometimes bordering on disgust, toward effeminate men and boys.'22 The
118. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 237 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
119. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
120. See, e.g., Heller v. Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224, 1227 (D. Or. 2002)
(finding sex discrimination when an employer fired a lesbian employee because she was involved in an
intimate relationship with a woman, and the termination would not have taken place had the employee
been involved with a man).
121. See, e.g., Lesbian Teen Sues to Force School to Hold Prom, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/12/esbian-teen-sues-force-school-hold-
prom/?page=2 (describing school regulations forbidding students from bringing same-sex dates and
forbidding girls from wearing tuxedos); Sheila Byrd, Ceara Strgis, Lesbian High School Student, Told She
Can't Wear Tuxedo in Yearbook, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/10/16/ceara-sturgis-lesbian-hig-n_323968.htnl (reporting on an openly lesbian high school student
who was prohibited from wearing a tuxedo in her school's yearbook).
122. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Oyienuttion: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE LJ. 1, 26-27 (1995) (arguing that "[tiomboys are far
more acceptable and unproblematic today than are sissies, who, it is still feared, are at a high risk of growing
up to be homosexual or transsexual and for whom clinical treatment is more often prescribed. This is
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intuition here is that by treating sexual orientation differences as completely
benign, not only will more people become gay, per the discussion above in Part
II.F.1, but also more boys and men will become effeminate.
Beyond concerns with effeminacy, intuitions related to sexual orientation
differences and gender insecurity can also be seen in the context of family law,
where courts express concern that gay and lesbian parents will not be able to
adequately instill gender differences in their children. Indeed, New York's
highest court expressly included this intuition among its reasons for sustaining
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, citing the value to children of
daily exposure to "living models of what both a man and a woman are like."'
23
Florida likewise defended its ban on adoption by gay people by claiming that
dual-gender parenting plays a vital role in shaping gender identity.'24 Although
one might argue that the leap from ending antigay discrimination to the endan-
germent of gender differences gives over far too much power to the law, the
intuitions are strong and influential, as these examples suggest.
III. THEORIZING THE LEGAL WORK OF INTUITIONS
The significant role of intuitions in sustaining legal distinctions based
on sexual orientation prompts questions regarding intuitions' influence in
lawmaking more generally. In this Part, I offer several provisional observations.
First are normative concerns about the power of intuitions to shape legal
decisionmaking and, in particular, decisions to sustain burdens on individual
rights. As we have seen, judges sometimes directly acknowledge the intuitions
that shape their legal analysis;'25 likewise, the public campaigns discussed above
further evidence of the disproportionate pull of gender-masculinity in a girl is approved while femininity
in a boy is not only troublesome, but a marker for homosexual orientation") (foomotes omitted).
Courts are increasingly, though not uniformly, protecting transgender individuals from discrimination
when the court has a sense that the new gender is fixed. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293,
308 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that "in refusing to hire [a transgender woman] because her appearance and
background did not comport with the decisionmaker's sex stereotypes about how men and women
should act and appear... [the employer] violated Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination"). But
see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting discrimination claim brought
by transgender bus driver). Courts are also increasingly protecting effeminate men from sex discrimina-
tion); cf. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (2001) (holding that a valid sex
discrimination claim existed because the verbal abuse at issue occurred because of the plaintiffs "effeminate
appearance").
123. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
124. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dept. of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 1), 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th
Cir. 2004).
125. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing invocations of intuition to sustain bans
on marriage and adoption by gay people).
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frame many of their messages to trigger intuitions detrimental to gay people's
equality.'26
The relatively open operation of these intuitions raises both moral and phi-
losophical questions about whether decisionmaking regarding individual rights
should rest on grounds that are neither demonstrable nor contestable. After all,
the very essence of the intuitions is that they are not the product of a rational
operation that can be subjected to the analytic scrutiny typically applied in
court.127 (One might say that a certain lack of rationality accompanies most
forms of public lawmaking, both in legislatures and through direct democratic
action, but even in those circumstances, constitutional constraints of rationality
and nonarbitrariness continue to apply.) 2'
If we accept that decisions regarding legal burdens rest on intuitions as
much as, or more than, on rational analysis, we have also arguably acknowledged
a profound institutional design defect. That is, despite our best systemic efforts to
insure rigorous and well-informed decisionmaking, there are, at least in the area
of sexual orientation, and I would argue also in the regulation of other vulnerable
social groups,'29 serious and troubling gaps in regulation.
Reliance on intuitions prompts more instrumental concerns, as well. Judge
Richard Posner is helpful in illustrating the difficulty here. On the one hand,
Judge Posner has affirmatively embraced intuition as an important component of
good decisionmaking. Intuition, he has written, "frequently encapsulates highly
relevant experience" and "produces tacit knowledge that may be a more accurate
and speedier alternate in particular circumstances to analytical reasoning, even
though, being tacit, it is inarticulate."'3° Yet even he acknowledges, on the other
hand, that the value of intuitions is limited by the experiences of the person
doing the intuiting. "We must not.., suppose intuition a sure guide to sound
decision making," he wrote, adding that "[a]n intuitive decision may ignore
126. See ProtectMarriage.com, supra note 108.
127. This is not to say that all intuitions are empirically untestable; some surely are.
128. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 737 (1964) ("[IThe fact
that a challenged legislative apportionment plan was approved by the electorate is without federal con-
stitutional significance, if the scheme adopted fails to satisfy the basic requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
129. See generally Goldberg, supra note 20 (analyzing the gap between empirical evidence about
social groups and the justifications for legal regulation of those groups).
130. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1049,
1064 (2006) (citations omitted); cf. Richard Epstein, Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make
Sound Decisions With Limited Knowledge, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 12 (2006) ("[lntuition ends up as a
guide through this moral thicket, useful but limited. And in modem thought it is more likely to be
displaced as two features come together first, as the factual patterns in particular cases move further away
from those that generated our bedrock intuitions, and second, as we develop more powerful functional
theories. The point here is not unfamiliar-intuitions yield to protocols in many areas of life.").
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critical factors that lie outside the range of the person's experience that informs
his intuition."'' Those who have reviewed the empirical literature on the rela-
tive virtues of reasoning and intuitive reasoning confirm this concern, observing
that intuitions often lack reliability because they derive mainly from the
necessarily limited life experiences of the individual in question.
M
Further, because of their deliberately nonfalsifiable nature, intuition-based
justifications for government action create greater openings than evidence-
based rationales for the unfiltered influence of bias, even without the awareness
of the decisionmaker him or herself. As some scholars have observed, "intuition
is... the likely pathway by which undesirable influences, like the race, gender, or
attractiveness of the parties, affect the legal system." ''
American philosophers have also railed against the grip of intuition on
public decisionmaking. John Stuart Mill, for example, listed intuition as "one of
the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions, an uphol-
der of conservative doctrines, and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human
improvement.'
34
Other philosophers, by contrast, were more sanguine about the possibility of
limiting intuition's effects. As William James observed, "[r]eason, per se, can
inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse
the other way.
' '3
James's view is reinforced by both cognitive psychologists and judges who
make clear that intuition-based decisionmaking is not going anywhere. As
131. Posner, supra note 130, at 1064; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 10-
11(2008).
132. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 271-72
(1990) (highlighting literature from fields outside law that suggest "the superiority of probabilistic methods"
of reasoning). Others have identified similar challenges and perils associated with reliance on intuition
in medicine. Citing a widely read medical writer's observation that "[clogent medical judgments meld
first impressions-gestalt-with deliberate analysis,"' they argue that the same balance between intuition
and more rigorous forms of analysis should carry over to law. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (2007)
("Like cogent medical judgments, cogent legal judgments call for deliberation. Justice depends on it.").
Cass Sunstein has made similar observations with respect to judicial reliance on heuristics more
generally, which he describes as "quite valuable" in general, but also as leading, in some cases, 'to severe
and systematic errors."' Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751 (2003)
(citation omitted).
133. Guthrie et al., supra note 132, at 31.
134. ROGER FRANTz, TWO MINDS: INTUITION AND ANALYSIS IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THOUGHT 44 (2005) (describing Mill's reaction to the role of intuition in public discourse and
decisionmaking).
135. Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund, Social Inuionists Answer Six Questions About Moral
Psychology, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORAL INTUITION AND
DIVERSITY 181, 194 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008) (quoting MATT RIDLEY, NATURE VIA
NURTURE 39 (2004)).
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several scholars have observed, "[e]liminating all intuition from judicial deci-
sion making is both impossible and undesirable because it is an essential part of
how the human brain functions."'' 6 And another: "In general, there is no plausi-
ble form of adjudicative absolutism that can consistently escape the need for
intuitionism at some crucial point.'
137
Yet there is little within the adjudicative, legislative, and initiative and
referendum processes that acts as a check on the problems associated with the
work of unfiltered intuitions. Constitutional adjudication, which has the most
formalized screening process among these forms of lawmaking, typically demands
only rational basis review of most decisionmaking, including sexual-orientation-
based classifications in most jurisdictions.3 1 In the legislative and public
initiative contexts, there are even fewer limits. 39  And public discourse has
virtually no limits at all; legislators and campaigners express their own intuitions
and appeal to the intuitions (and biases) of others with regularity."4
IV. TACKLING THE STICKY INTUITIONS
Given the institutional design that leads courts and representative bodies
to review the operation of intuitions only weakly, the regulatory ball is in the
advocates' court. In some respects, this regulatory work has been ongoing for
many years. Amicus briefs, expert testimony, and advertising campaigns
aimed directly at disrupting negative intuitions about gay people's lives and
136. Guthrie et al., supra note 132, at 5.
137. Wright, supra note 23, at 1406; see also id. at 1384 (arguing that "intuition is invariably cen-
tral-whether overtly so or not-to the process of arriving at a judicial outcome by any standard
recognized means").
138. The U.S. Supreme Court has not issued a definitive pronouncement on the level of scrutiny
appropriate for government action restricting the rights of gay people, although it indicated in Romer v.
Evans that it was applying rational basis review to Colorado's gay-specific amendment. See Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996). It did not commit explicitly to a level of scrutiny in Lawrence v. Texas,
and the form of review applied in that case has been the subject of much debate. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the standard of review when a
challenged law harms a particular group); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundmnental
Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L REV. 1893, 1916-17 (2004) (describing the vague
standard of review in Lawrence as "bound to draw criticism and ... likely to generate confusion"). In most
jurisdictions, however, courts have applied only rational basis review to sexual-orientation-based
classifications. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 293 n.2
(1997) (listing courts that have rejected heightened scrutiny arguments). But see In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) and Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009) (applying heightened
scrutiny to state-sponsored sexual orientation discrimination).
139. For example, William Eskridge has described the campaign that led to Florida's ban on adop-
tion by lesbians and gay men as, in part, "aggressively negative, invoking themes of disgust and contagion."
Eskridge, supra note 61, at 1013.
140. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 22 (reviewing the hostile commentary toward lesbians and gay
men within California's Proposition 8 campaign).
the nature of sexual orientation are regularly introduced both in court and in the
public debate.
Yet individuals often remain deeply committed to their intuitions even in
the face of contrary evidence. As Dan Kahan has explained, "[rneal-world people
tend to be anti-Bayesians: rather than update their prior beliefs based on new
information, they tend to evaluate the persuasiveness of new information based
on its conformity to their experience."'' In other words, factual contestation,
while likely helpful, may be itself insufficient to produce the destabilization
necessary to unstick sticky intuitions. The question, then, is how best to marshal
insights from cognitive theory and translate them into practice. This Part makes
several tentative suggestions.
A. Insights From Cognitive Theory
Cognitive theory suggests at least two possible directions for challenging
settled intuitions. One, which has already been integrated into advocacy efforts,
draws on Gordon Allport's contact hypothesis.'42 The straightforward idea is that
prejudices (or, in our treatment here, negative intuitions) are best reduced by
contact with the "other," which in turn leads individuals to reconceptualize, in
a more positive fashion, the group category to which that "other" belongs.'
43
Consistent with this theory, many advocates have encouraged gay people to
come out to their friends, families, neighbors, and colleagues, on the idea that
knowing an actual gay person may force reconsideration of some of the intu-
itions outlined in Part II above, including those related to hypersexualization,
141. Dan M. Kahan, Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L REV. 115,121 (2007) (footnote omitted).
He adds: "Known as 'biased assimilation,' this tendency also has a straightforward cultural explanation:
ordinary persons aren't in a position to identify when new information is credible, and thus a ground for
updating their prior beliefs, without recourse to the very same cultural heuristics that have generated
their existing beliefs." Id. at 121-22 (footnotes omitted).
142. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
143. Allport's hypothesis has been elaborated by many. See, e.g., Herbert Blumer, Race Prejudice as a
Sense of Group Position, 1 PAC. SOC. REV. 3, 6 (1958) (arguing that the source of racial prejudice is
found in "a complicated social process in which the individual is himself shaped and organized"); Douglas
H. Yam & Gregory Todd Jones, A Biological Approach to Understanding Resistance to Apology, Forgiveness,
and Reconciliation in Group Conflict, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72 n.35 (2008) (discussing work
related to Allport's hypothesis). In recent years, sociologists and others have questioned some of the
hypothesis's core assumptions and applications. See, e.g., H.D. FORBES, ETHNIc CONFLICT: COMMERCE,
CULTURE, AND THE CONTACT HYPoTHESIS 112 (1997) (concluding that studies of proximity and
prejudice "show no clear and consistent correlation between greater proximity [i.e., contact] and lower
levels of prejudice"); cf. Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact
Theory, 90J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 751 (2006) (finding that the conditions required for
contact theory are not necessary for prejudice reduction).
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mentioned in Part II.A, and dangers to society, discussed in Part II.D.' , Indeed,
in recent campaigns regarding marriage and other issues, advocates have also
encouraged community members to come out about having gay family members
and friends as well as about their support for marriage equality for same-sex
couples. 4 The ideas reflected in the contact hypothesis also underlie the stan-
dard approach to presenting testimony by gay people in judicial and legislative
proceedings. Unlike most other forms of testimony, in which the witness moves
quickly from self-introduction to the problem at hand, advocates typically
encourage gay and lesbian witnesses who are testifying in the context of a sexual
orientation discrimination matter to introduce themselves in depth and share
their life stories, including details about their realization that they were gay
and their coming out process.'46
A second theory takes an even more interactive approach toward triggering
new intuitions. This is the theory of role-taking, developed in the early aca-
demic literature by Robert Selman, who wrote that role-taking was important
"as a critical psychological or social-cognitive skill for the growth of moral
144. See, e.g., PARENTS, FAMILIES, & FRIENDS OF LESBIANS AND GAYS (PFLAG), BE
YOURSELF: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH
11 (2006), available at http://www.pflag.org/fileadmin/user-upload/Publications/BeYourself.pdf
("Homophobia, biphobia and transphobia are being challenged, however, as more and more people are
learning the truth about GLBT people. Attitudes are starting to change partly because GLBT people
are being open and honest about who they are. Attitudes are changing also because other people are
standing up with GLBT people to say, 'They are my friends, or my children, or my brothers-and I'm proud
of them."); see also David L. Chambers & Steven K. Homer, Honesty, Privacy, and Shame: When Gay
People Talk About Other Gay People to Nongay People, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 255, 255 (1997) (noting
that "more and more gay people believe that the most important agent for reducing both officially sanc-
tioned and private intolerance toward gay people is to increase the number of people known to be gay").
145. See CAROLYN WELCH GRIFFIN ET AL., BEYOND ACCEPTANCE: PARENTS OF LESBIANS AND
GAYS TALK ABOUT THEIR EXPERIENCES 117-26 (1986) (describing the ability of parents of lesbians
and gays to effect acceptance and tolerance by openly embracing their child's sexual orientation); see also
PFLAG: Parents, Family, & Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Coming Out Help for Friends and Families,
http://community.pflag.org/Page.aspx?pid=539 (last visited June 4, 2010).
146. See, e.g., Perry Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 77-78 (detailing the "stages" of Plaintiff
Jeffrey Zarrillo's coming out history); see also id. at 152-53 (discussing the difficulties of Plaintiff Kristin
Perry's need "to decide every day if [she wants] to come out"); cf. Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 3017 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 11 lth Cong. (2009), available at
http://edlabor.house.gov/documents/1 1 1/pdf/testimony/20090923VandyBethGlennTestimony.pdf
(statement of Vandy Beth Glenn, former employee of the Georgia Office of Legislative Counsel) (detailing
her own coming out process: from the childhood awareness that she was a girl, to the disclosure of her
gender identity to her employer who hired her when living as a man and then fired her after and
because of her transition). On the theory of story-sharing in another deeply contested context, see
Sarah E. Bums, Notes From the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 197-99
(1990) (describing the "women's voices" amicus briefs filed in cases challenging the regulation of abor-
tion to bring before the U.S. Supreme Court the experiences of women who have had abortions).
reasoning. 1 47 Here, the idea is also straightforward: "Simply by putting yourself
into the shoes of another person you may instantly feel pain, sympathy, or other
vicarious emotional responses.' 48 As psychologist Jonathan Haidt has explained,
role-taking "is one of the principle pathways of moral reflection according to
Piaget, Kohlberg, and other cognitive developmentalists. A person comes to see
an issue or dilemma from more than one side and thereby experiences multiple
competing intuitions.'
49
B. From Cognitive Theory to Practice
Of course, translating these academic insights into litigation strategies and
political campaigns is more than a little challenging. Not only is role-taking not
standard practice in either judicial or legislative fora, but it is also difficult to
imagine how, exactly, one would motivate individuals who are comfortable with
their intuitions to risk destabilization in this way. Bennett Capers has suggested
that one might do this in the criminal jury trial context by explicitly directing
jurors to imagine the defendant as having a different sex or race as a means of
"debiasing," or in the terms here, "de-intuitioning.' '0 But as Capers acknowl-
edges, asking decisionmakers in criminal or civil litigation to imagine the parties
as individuals (or entities) other than who they actually are provokes a host of
constitutional concerns.151
In another context, a federal circuit judge addressing the military's sexual-
orientation-based exclusion of service members, asked readers to imagine
heterosexuals having to change their sexual orientation.'52 "Would heterosexu-
als living in a city that passed an ordinance burdening those who engaged in or
desired to engage in sex with persons of the opposite sex find it easy not only to
abstain from heterosexual activity but also to shift the object of their sexual
desires to persons of the same sex?" he wrote, in the course of finding that the
exclusion violated a gay service member's constitutional rights. 3
In a more limited way than role-taking, perhaps, attention to language may
do some work in bridging differences and reshaping intuitions. There have been
147. ROBERT L. SELMAN, THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL AWARENESS 15 (2003); see also Robert
Selman, The Relation of Role Taking to the Development of Moral Judgment in Children, 42 CHILD DEV.
79(1971).
148. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to
Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814, 819 (2001).
149. Id.; see also 1. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1,
3-4 (2008).
150. Capers, supra note 149, at 25.
151. Id. at 29-30.
152. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cit. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
153. Id.
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deliberate rhetorical efforts in the context of sodomy law challenges to remind
decisionmakers that the regulated acts at issue were not themselves homosexual
and thereby to constrain the impulse toward disgust. In this regard, I think back
to my own experience working on sodomy law challenges as a senior lawyer with
Lambda Legal. In framing arguments, we did not use the phrases "homosexual
sex" or "homosexual sodomy" that appear in so many of the discussions, both
judicial and popular, regarding sodomy laws."4 Instead, we found ways to talk
about "same-sex couples' sexual intimacy" or "sexual relations between same-sex
couples" or other similarly wordy phrases as a way of suggesting to the court that
whatever intuitions were in play should be applied to the acts at issue without
regard to the sex of the couples engaging in those acts."' We can see similar
efforts today in the use of the phrase "marriage equality" and "same-sex
couples' marriage rights" rather than "same-sex marriage" in an effort to
reinforce that marriage itself does not have a sexual orientation.'56
Outside the litigation context, there may be more room for creative
strategizing, particularly with new media, to expose and disrupt settled intui-
tions. One approach that has proved popular, though again only with willing
subjects, is the administration of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which
often alerts test takers to racial biases of which they were unaware.I"7 Yet
without conscious, carefully constructed, and repeated efforts to "debias," the
underlying intuitions may continue to do their work unfettered.'58
154. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (ruling that there is no "fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy"); Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188, 195 (Ga. 1996) ("The
sole basis asserted by the State in support of its sodomy statutes is its moral interest in condemning acts
of homosexual sodomy.").
155. Notably, although the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas referred to "homosexual sodomy,"
those references came mainly in connection with reviewing earlier cases and the historical enforcement of
sodomy laws. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003). Toward the end of its decision, the Court
wrote, instead, about "the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct."
Id. at 576.
156. See, e.g., Lambda Legal, Amici Curiae Brief Filed in Support of Same-Sex Couples' Right to
Marry, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-worklin-courtlbriefs/woo-v-califomia-brief-2.htmr (last visited June
4, 2010); see also Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim Within the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy, 17
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 344-45 n.3 (2008) (discussing terminological choices involved in
describing marriage rights for same-sex couples).
157. See Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited June 4, 2010); see also
Cass Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 405 (2009) ("The central
finding [of the IAT test] is that most people show an automatic bias against African-Americans, older
people, gays and lesbians, and others-even when they are unaware of it, wish to be unbiased, and indeed
are stunned to see that they are automatically biased. There is evidence that people's actual behavior is
sometimes affected by their automatic biases rather than by their conscious judgments."). For further
discussion of implicit bias, see generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).
158. See generally Christine Jolts & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199 (2006).
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"Old" media might also hold some potential to prompt reflection.
Consider, for example, the ACLU's advertising campaign around racial profiling,
which took the same facial features and, in a series of photographs, displayed
them on a face with different skin colors.'59 Presumably the advertising was
aimed at a sort of involuntary role-taking, where the viewer of the photography
would have little choice but to rethink their views regarding the significance of
racial differences, at least for a moment. Conceivably, some similar creative role-
taking strategies regarding sexual orientation differences could be developed for
the involuntary viewer." ° Perhaps the field of subliminal messaging could also
be tapped more deliberately to disrupt intuitions regarding lesbians and gay men,
though these efforts have provoked controversy in other fields regarding both
their use and their effectiveness and would potentially do so here as well.'6'
Another option, more familiar to the legal scholarship,'62 would involve a
move toward greater candor about the intuitions that seem to be operating in a
given context. The aim would be to expose as intuitions those characterizations
of lesbians and gay men that are presented as fact. So, for example, advocates
might address overtly the underlying concerns with disgust, societal harm, or
the shifting morality of children that they suspect are operating in the deci-
sionmaking environment.
In theory, the approach seems to be a sensible one. If the intuitions are
having an effect on decisionmaking, it seems remiss not to address them. Indeed,
advocates sometimes recommend that lawyers who represent gay and
transgender clients not try to hide their clients' identities for risk that the
nondisclosure may leave negative intuitions regarding the client to operate
unfettered, often without the decisionmaker being aware of them.'63
Some debiasing efforts have been made in connection with judicial trainings, which not only
supply up-to-date information regarding doctrine and relevant data related to sexual orientation but
also, in some settings, encourage judges to engage in role-taking activities designed to broaden
perspectives on the interaction of lesbians, gay men, and the law. See, e.g., The Williams Institute,
UCLA School of Law, Judicial Training Program, http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/Judicial/
index.html (last visited June 4, 2010) ("provid[ing] state and federal judges with substantive training on
legal issues impacting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people"); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Educating
Judges About Lesbinand Gay Parenring: A Sinudadion, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 173, 179-82 (1991) (discussing
the value of simulation in judicial training regarding custody disputes involving lesbian and gay parents).
159. ACLU, Campaign Against Racial Profiling Ad, http://www.aclu.orglgraphics/guilt-ad.jpg
(last visited June 4, 2010).
160. See generay WILSON BRYAN KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION: AD MEDIA'S MANIPULATION
OF NOT So INNOCENT AMERICA (1974).
161. See, e.g., John R. Vokey & J. Don Read, Subliminal Messages: Between the Devil and the Media,
40AM. PSYCHOL. 1231 (1985).
162. See infra note 166.
163. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TiPS FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES WORKING WITH
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, & TRANSoENDER CLIENTS 1 (2007), available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/
1412
Yet this approach comes with risks, too. For one, explicitly articulating the
intuition might reinforce rather than disrupt it. This is particularly easy to imag-
ine with respect to the disgust intuition discussed in Part II.A, which, if it is as
primal as scholars have suggested,1" may best be overcome by leaving it
unmentioned.
In addition, addressing certain wide-ranging intuitions may lead to more
complications than benefits. I am thinking here of intuitions related to the effect
of eliminating antigay discrimination on the public's morals and welfare, such
as those discussed in Parts II.D, II.E, and II.F.2. Although advocates can, and
regularly do, make claims and introduce supporting evidence regarding the
harmful social consequences of discrimination, 165 claims about the effect of legal
change on public morality are, as noted earlier, not susceptible to evidentiary-
based arguments. And indeed, where a decisionmaker might be persuaded by
facts related to the harms caused by discrimination, the task of shifting views
regarding the relationship between law and morality is larger and arguably
more difficult.
An additional potential risk is raised by the literature on judicial candor.
The debate, in essence, concerns whether candor regarding courts' decisionmak-
ing is advisable in the name of transparency, or harmful both to judicial
reasoning processes and to the judiciary's legitimacy. 166 For purposes here, the
central point is that candor does not necessarily produce desired outcomes,
which, in this context, would be the rejection of negative intuitions about gay
people. Instead, the candor literature suggests that, rather than move away from
negative views, courts and others will become increasingly committed to their
DocServer/ProyectoPoderosoFlyer.cd.pdf?doclD=2321 (arguing that advocates must "be prepared to
address hostile and irrelevant arguments" pertaining to sexual orientation or gender identity). A
separate but related risk is that the decisionmaker will sense that the client is hiding something, and that
sense will translate to a negative judgment regarding the client's credibility. See, e.g., Cole Thaler,
Representing Transgender Clients, GPSOLO, Apr./May 2007, at 52, available at http://www.abanet.org/
genpractice/magazine/2007/apr-may/transgenderclients.html (arguing that it is important to "use the
correct name and pronoun [which correspond to a client's gender identity] in all pleadings,
correspondence, and other documents," unless the client "might prefer that any transgender-related
courtroom discussion take place at sidebar rather than in open court").
164. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text; see also H.A. Chapman, D.A. Kim, J.M.
Susskind, & A.K. Anderson, In Bad Taste: Evidence for the Oral Orions of Moral Disgust, 27 SCIENCE 323
(2009); cf. NUSSBAUM, supra note 59, at 3 (arguing that, as in the context of sexuality, "the disgust of a
judge or jury at a murder may put the defendant into a class of especially heinous offenders").
165. Cf. David M. Huebner, Gregory Rebchook & Susan Kegeles, Experiences of Harassment,
Discriminaton, and Physical Violence Among Young Gay and Bisexual Men, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 7 (2004).
166. See generally Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990) (maintaining that
an insistence on candor would be ill-advised because judges who are misguided may reach better decisions
than judges who clearly understand their decisionmaking); Gail Heriot, Way Beyond Candor, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1945 (1991) (critiquing Altman's claims).
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intuitions and willing to rely explicitly on them. Indeed, one could put the
Florida adoption and New York marriage decisions 161 into this category. If courts
are willing to rely openly on their own intuitions and unprovable sense of things,
there is little advocates can do to overcome adverse decisions other than gen-
erally question the propriety of intuition-based decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
As we turn toward the future of sexual orientation's legal significance, it
becomes clear that negative intuitions, impulses, and instincts about lesbians
and gay men loom large as barriers to equality, particularly given that empirical
debates regarding sexual orientation differences are largely resolved. Although
work must continue on the development of doctrinal and theoretical arguments
for equality and liberty, we do ourselves a disservice by leaving these intuitions
underexplored. Many difficult questions remain about the role of intuitions in
decisionmaking, the reasons for their stickiness, and the strategies advocates
might deploy to grapple with them. What is clear, though, is that, decades after
the sticky intuitions first surfaced in gay rights conflicts, these questions are
pressing, and they demand our vigorous engagement.
167. See supra Parts I.A, I.G.
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